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Abstract: In this paper I am going to explore some of the major theoretical concepts and ideas in 
Luca Fantacci’s work devoted to the history of money. As a historical check on Fantacci’s theory I 
will present various moments in Russian monetary history interpreted in the light of the ideas of the 
La moneta: storia di un’instituzione mancata. I will  compare Fantacci’s theory of division 
between the unit of account and the medium of exchange with those of Walther Eucken and the 
Austrian School as well as of some other contemporary authors. A new institutional reading of the 
evolution of money “money as an institutional compound” is proposed. 
 
JEL code: B52, E42, N10 








                                                                 
1The first version of this paper was written in 2006 during my stay at ICER, Turin, and was published in Bulgarian 
in Sociological problems, Academy of Sciences, 20008, as: Za parite kato institucia, Sociologicheski Problemi, 
2008, No 1-2, pp. 250-280. Subsequently after this publication and comments from different sources the paper was 




Luca Fantacci is an economist and a historian who works at the Università Commerciale 
Bocconi in Milan. His recent publications include a book in Italian (Fantacci, 2005), two articles in 
English (Fantacci, 2005a, 2008) and an article in French (Fantacci, 2006). Taken together, these 
four publications present his views on money, which rest on a rereading of monetary history and a 
novel interpretation of the historical concepts of money.  
What are Luca Fantacci’s major and leading concepts which deserve discussion? Why 
should we pay attention to the works of a relatively unknown scholar?  
First of all, the book La moneta: Storia di un’instituzione mancata is an essay on the 
history of money and monetary thought, from ancient Greece to the present. It does not intend to 
provide a complete coverage or classification of monetary forms throughout the centuries, but 
rather to highlight the most significant turning points in the articulation of monetary functions (unit of 
account, medium of exchange and store of value). The three sections of the book are dedicated to 
a reinterpretation of the major phases in monetary history: ideal money, commodity money, and 
fiduciary money.  
Fantacci doesn’t regard money in its mechanical and often simplified sense (as in the neo-
classical model), but as a “human” institution (p. 23) with a historical evolution - as a historically 
sensitive institution, using Hodgson’s terminology - whose diversity and vivacity pose a number of 
theoretical challenges. Naturally, the institutional view of money is not new, having had its adherents 
for a long time (as we shall see below). Fantacci develops his concepts on the institutional character 
of monetary evolution in reply to the quandary posed years ago by  the Italian historian Carlo 
Cipolla (1963, 1975) as to the reason for the millennial historical trend towards monetary 
depreciation. In reply to his own question, Cipolla proposed a universal “law” resting on diverse 
reasons; for his part, Fantacci considers that a better reason for long-term devaluation may be 
found in the institutional evolution of money
2 and, most importantly, in its duality.  
Secondly, Fantacci subjects Western monetary history to a careful reading and finds that 
the basic functions of money which modern economists learn from textbooks (unit of account, 
medium of exchange, and means of preserving value) had a much more complex linkage in the past; 
we cannot comprehend them today and are unable to reconstruct them (p.  53) without recourse to 
an alternative theoretical model. This specific view on the history of money (separation between 
means of measurement and means of exchange, ideal  and real money) has a long and fruitful 
tradition in the Italian economic and historical scholarship (Einaudi, 1936, 1940, Luzzatto, 1958, in 
particular  pp.156-173, Cipolla, 1974, 1975). According to Fantacci, i f we divide Western 
European history roughly into two long periods, the antique or pre-modern (until the 15th or 18th 
centuries AD) and the modern (from the 15th or 18th Centuries to date), and set certain stipulations 
on the conditionality of this division and on the purity or distinctions of these periods (also Fantacci, 
2008), we note some principal differences in monetary systems. The division of money into ideal 
and real is characteristic of the first period, in line with the division between its functions as a means 
of measurement (unit of account) and a means of exchange (intermediary medium). Throughout this 
period, money was devoid of its third function of storing value, hence the proscription on “monetary 
                                                                 
2 As early as 1909 the Russian economist M. Tugan-Baranovsky formulated Cippola’s “law”  (while analysing the 
16th  Century  price  revolution),  claiming s imilarly  to  Fantacci  that  the explanation can be institutional and 
sociological (Tugan-Baranovsky, 1909, pp. 379-393).    3 
growth” (interest). For the sake of brevity, I shall call this monetary system Type 1: divided or 
differentiated.  
On the other hand, in the modern period ideal and real money are indistinguishable, their 
reckoning and exchange functions merge (they are performed by a single object, whether a piece of 
metal or a piece of paper), while the store of value function assumes a leading role in the modern 
understanding of money. I shall call this monetary system Type 2: syncretic (merged, monolithic).  
Fantacci finds historical proof for his theoretical model (in Caesar’s Rome, the Middle 
Ages and elsewhere
3) and also  presents  empirical and technical proofs of his theoretical 
connections, be it in price behaviour or in diverse monetary reforms such as the Piedmont monetary 
stabilisations from the 16
th to the 18





Thirdly, according to Fantacci the function of measurement precedes that of exchange both 
historically and logically (“no exchange is possible without a measure,” p. 37); while measures 
accompanied humanity from its very emergence, intermediacy in exchange arose relatively later, as 
the natural economy collapsed. This claim is opposed to the traditional interpretation which accords 
primacy to money as intermediary, followed logically by money as measure of value.  
Fourth, as mentioned  in the spirit of the Italian tradition, Fantacci distinguishes the 
measurement function implicit in ideal money from the exchange function implicit in real money. 
Ideal or imaginary money (moneta immaginaria)
5 has no definite physical shape, being a measure 
of value; real money has a specific physical shape through which it transfers value. Thus, ideal 
money is not associated with a specific material vehicle and has no substantial expression (such as a 
certain metal, be it gold, silver, or copper); its origin is extra-economic, being sacral or else legal. 
The moment money is minted into a coin it ceases being ideal and becomes real
6.  
Fifth, within the framework of real money (the means of exchange), Fantacci stresses the 
diverse functions and types of petty money (moneta piccola, moneta bassa, small coin, small 
change) and grand money (moneta grossa, moneta alta, large coin). While petty money is as a 
rule base (its legal value is greater than the value of metal in it, hence its frequently being dubbed 
“token coinage”) and serves internal turnover within a set sovereign community or country, grand 
money is generally valuable in itself and serves exchange between sovereign communities. Fantacci 
also calls the former “internal money” while the latter means of inter-communal and international 
exchange is “external money.”  
Internal and external money demarcate two types of monetary areas with differing 
dependencies. Fundamental differences between internal (petty) and external (grand) money are 
                                                                 
3  On the periods mentioned:  Osokin (2003, [1888]), Kulisher (2004, [1909/1931]), Burns (1927), Salvioli (1929), 
Romero (1967), Miskimin (1975), Rostovtzeff (2002) and Barbero (2006). Though this is a digression, Charlemagne 
introduced a common European unit of account (ideal money),  while the medium of exchange (real money) 
remained distinct within each part of his empire (Fantacci, 2005, p. 54); the difference with today’s euro – both a 
common unit of account and a common medium of exchange – is evident.  
4 Fantacci has made fruitful analytical steps towards what had been put forward by Mark Bloch in 1933: “The 
economic history of mediaeval money – or rather its human history – has yet to be written… This economic 
history can not achieve its aim, unless it is also a social history – what I mean is that history has to remember that 
the human environment is composed of various groups, whose disparate ways of life are reflected by the 
contrasts in their money habits)” (1933, p. 32). 
5 Cipolla (1975) has also called it moneta fantasma. 
6 The relationships between unit of account and medium of exchange are a subject of active debate between 
anthropologists and economists (Dalton, 1965, Codere, 1968, Melitz, 1970, recently Aglietta and Orléan, 2002, also 
the analyses of John Henry, Michael Hudson in the collection of articles of Wray (ed) (2004).) Peacock (2006) has 
made an interesting review of three recent books on the history of money in Ancient Greece, which in one way or 
another argues against the traditional quantitative interpretations of the origins of money.   4 
defined by different degrees and mechanisms of generating confidence. Diverse forms of religious or 
national sovereignty exist within communities (cities, countries, empires), while market mechanisms 
lead relations between communities, with money accepted at its material value (quantitatively by 
weighing and qualitatively by testing).  
After introducing these different aspects of money, Fantacci tackles the different types of 
monetary policy (changing the face value or metal content) applicable to each type of money
7. 
Moreover, he points out that redistributional links predominate in internal (petty) money, while 
exchange prevails with external (grand) money.  
 
Figure 1 Types of monetary systems 
   
 
 
Sixth, within the second or ‘syncretic’ period Type 2 (which we may assume began with 
the adoption of the gold standard made by England in 1731 and by France in 1804), the merger of 
ideal and real money - i. e. of the measurement and exchange functions - underwent two major 
stages based on different material support: metal until the Great War and paper money to date. 
Convertibility became a basic principle, not just between one type and one means of exchange 
(internal  to external), but also and foremost between medium of exchange and unit of account. 
Within this period, value preservation and debt repayment became the major functions of money. 
The gold standard also underwent two main stages, the former featuring reconciliations through 
balance of trade and fixed external exchange rate rates (16
th to 18
th centuries), and the latter 
featuring variable exchange rates (18
th to 19
th centuries). Describing the latest stage, Fantacci lays 
particular stress on a Keynesian plan for international clearing which would reproduce the monetary 
principles of the pre-modern era (division between the exchange and measurement functions and 
removal of the store of value function) at international level. 
Seventh, since Fantacci considers money not only as material history but also as a way of 
thinking, he presents parallel histories of Western European money and of theories of money:  
 
“Money is a way of thinking. The ability to comprehend money in its historical evolution is 
related to our ability to reinstate conceptual horizons a nd discourses which have encompassed, 
defined and described money again and again. Hence, it is impossible to distinguish monetary history 
from the history of thought (p. 75)”.  
 
                                                                 
7 Coins have three values: internal set by the mint, nominal external value set by the state, and market external 
value determined by the market (Fantacci, 2005a, pp. 46-47).    5 
There is no doubt that occasionally reality and practice overtake thought and monetary 
theory, while sometimes the opposite happens (Fantacci offers multiple examples of this)
8. I would 
point out that a classical political economy essentially informs the second period, closely linked to 
the theory of metallic money (be it bimetal or monometallic), followed by a utilitarian theory. In both 
cases, the issue concerns different variants and manifestations of rationalism and positivism born in 
the modern epoch. Here is how Fantacci sums up the results of his studies: 
 
Ideal money is a measure of value. Metal money is a means of exchange. Fiduciary (paper) 
money is an instrument of anticipative or delayed receipt of value. In the ancien regime, money was 
a measure above all. In the metallic regime, money was a means before all else. Today money is a 
store before all else. (p. 262) 
 
Finally, from a purely normative point of view Fantacci claims that contemporary money is 
not the most efficient institution possible and that a return to the pre-modern dualistic model and to 
money’s circulatory essence could be taken into consideration (i. e., ways to deprive money of 
value could be sought). Fantacci shares Keynes’ claim that this division or duality is the essence of 
the monetary institution.  It seems that the truly distinctive feature of differentiated systems, as 
opposed to syncretic systems, is not simply the existence of a plurality of monetary forms and 
functions, but the existence of a relation between them, which is not fixed, nor simply variable, but 
rather managed in view of specific policy goals. In this sense, the author considers money as a lost 
opportunity, an institution whose evolution deviated from the optimal route. The author suggests a 
specific model where Group 1 includes two types of  monetary  policy, dependent on the 
connections “money – means of measurement”  (enhancement and abatement), or “money – metal” 
(reinforcement and debasement). The shift towards Group 2 leads to the decrease of the number of 
instruments of monetary policy
9. Degrees of freedom and an efficient institution were thus lost. 
Fantacci sees today’s monetary institution developing quantitatively at the expense of quality: 
something expressed in the book’s title.
10  
  A mere listing of these postulates shows that they offer opportunities for various 
interpretations  and new analyses. I shall begin with some issues connected more closely with 
Fantacci’s concepts, then present the concepts of other economists arguing similar theses, and 
conclude with a theoretical proposal on money as an institution. 
Prior to this, I wish to present some aspects of Russian monetary history. Having coalesced 
as a combination of European, Arab and Asian traditions and institutions, the Russian monetary 
system offers opportunities for discovering a number of shared as well as distinct features in support 




  Russian monetary history contains two basic peculiarities
11. First, it tracked Western 
European monetary development with a certain time lag; second, it exhibited a significantly greater 
inclination to retaining the differentiated Type 1. The latter is shown by the difficulties of importing 
                                                                 
8 Mitchell (1944). 
9 Fantacci (2008).  
10 As opposed to Fantacci (and Luzzatto, 1958), Cipolla argues that the unification of the measurement function 
with the exchange function is positive and goes as far as to suggest that the division of these functions is a sign 
of weakness (Cipolla, 1974). 
11 See Kulisher (2004, [1925]), Uht (1994), Kolomiec (2001), CBRF (2004), Ilin (2006) and Goland (2006).    6 
Western monetary institutions and particularly of merging the measurement and exchange functions, 
as well as by the mechanisms for generating confidence in money. As a whole, transition from the 
differentiated to the syncretic model was gradual and slow, with much wavering and resistance. 
While it may be argued that the overall thrust of Peter the Great’s reforms (1672-1725) resulted in 
a Type 2 monetary system, cyclic fluctuations brought reversions to Type 1. Even reforms by the 
likes of Speransky, Kankrin and later Vitte failed to attain complete parity between the reckoning 
and exchange functions. Curiously, history repeated itself also in the early Bolshevik years with the 
launch of the gold chervonets which were used as a measure and rarely circulated in exchange (this 
function was fulfilled by sovznaks). During the late 1990s’ financial crisis in post-Soviet Russia, the 
rift between measurement and exchange functions reappeared, with the US dollar or the so-called 
uchetnyye yedinitsy [“accounting units”] acting as measures. 
Going back in time, in  the 16
th century the silver rouble, equal to 100 silver kopecks, 
played the role of ideal money (measure), while exchange was effected primarily by copper 
kopecks called den’gi [“money”]
12. Prior to this, there had been two units for measuring value until 
1536 when they were merged: the Moscow rouble and the Novgorod silver rouble (Kluchevsky, 
2003, [1870/1900], p. 88). The metal content of the silver reckoning rouble changed in 1612, with 
the period between 1630 and 1680 witnessing an attempt to make the silver rouble become real 
money by minting it and putting it into circulation. These were the first steps towards a Type 2 
monetary system. As regards external money, this role was played by the so-called yefimka (a 
Russian corruption of joachimsthaler
13) which was equal in value to the thaller and whose issue 
was a treasury monopoly. Under the Tsar Aleksey Mikhaylovich (1629-1679), an attempt was 
made to introduce a copper coin (known to Russians from the Tartar invasion) with a nominal value 
equal to its silver equivalents alongside which it was intended to circulate. The object was to 
establish confidence in copper money which would then become a base internal coin or “token 
coin.”  
Peter the Great’s monetary reforms delivered a new and decisive thrust towards transition 
to a syncretic model. In the status quo ante, the means of measurement were represented by the 
silver rouble (100 kopecks), the poltinnik (50 kopecks), the polupoltinnik (25 kopecks), the 
gryvnya (10 kopecks), and the altyn’ (3 kopecks). This was ideal money and was not minted. As 
regards real money (means of exchange), this comprised the wire silver kopeck (1 kopeck), the 
den’ga (0.5 kopecks) and the polushka (0.25 kopecks). The sole nexus one can find between 
means of measurement and means of exchange was the wire silver kopeck. As mentioned above, 
external money was the yefimka (since 1649). Means of exchange depreciated rapidly and 
counterfeit copper coinage appeared. Meanwhile, we will recall that the large silver coin called the 
thaller appeared in Western Europe in the 16
th century.  
Peter the Great drew his ideas on monetary reform from Western Europe, especially after 
his stay in England, where he had held thorough conversations with Isaac Newton who, as head of 
the Royal Mint, had fathered the British monetary reform.  
Between 1700 and 1704, Russia saw the basic face values of new post-reform money 
appear: foremost among them a run of date-stamped silver coins (50, 25, 10, 5 and 3 kopecks) 
which circulated alongside copper den’gi and polushki. A silver rouble equal in metal content to the 
thaller was minted in 1704. The European decimal system was also adopted, with the rouble, the 
grivenik and the kopeck (and the latter’s halves, viz. the poltyna, the pyatak, and the polushka) 
becoming  means of measurement. The  altyn’  was  withdrawn.  These measures represented a 
                                                                 
12 In 1603 the Moscow, Novgorod and Pskov mints were consolidated. 
13 Flandrin (2003).    7 
decisive step towards a transition to a Type 2 monetary system: ideal and real money, and hence 
the means of measurement and of exchange, were united in the silver rouble. At the same time, 
Peter minted the gold chervonets for external use, basing them entirely on the Venetian ducat 
(ducats were melted down and reminted as chervontsy). The value of this coin was also expressed 
in silver roubles and kopecks.  
To finance his campaigns and reforms, Peter was forced to cut the weight of his coins and 
reduce their quality, to “change the tariff” (without changing the content of means of 
measurement
14). As a whole, Peter’s monetary reform entailed inflation and the devaluation of 
exchange coinage (copper coins were devalued six to eight-fold), while wholesale counterfeiting has 
been well documented by chroniclers.  
By the first quarter of the 18
th century, monetary circulation was structured thus: 88.5 % 
silver coinage, 9.2 %   copper coinage, and 2.3 %  gold  coinage (Uht, 1994, p. 35). Peter’s 
monetary system had all in all endured. In general, one may state that by the close of Peter’s rule 
the system’s basic means of measurement was an imitation silver thaller, its external means of 
exchange was an imitation gold ducat, while its domestic means of exchange were coins of 
corrupted silver or of copper. Hence, one may conclude that Peter’s reforms - having commenced 
with the wire silver kopeck  - practically completed the  transition to a Type 2  with unified 
measurement and exchange functions.  
After Peter the Great, the m ajor stages in  the monetary evolution were the following: 
Catherine the Great (1729-1796) introduced paper money (assignatsiy) to supplant depreciating 
copper coinage in 1768. These bills initially had silver cover, yet this was to erode gradually and, 
especially after the Napoleonic Wars,  they depreciated (on 9 April 1812 assignatsiy were 
designated as statutory means of settlement in private transactions – legal tender). After the wars 
Speransky attempted a monetary reform, being followed by Kankrin. While finance minister in 
1843, the latter conducted a devaluation intended to bring the legal value of assignatsiy into line with 
their market value. He exchanged assignatsiy for state credit tickets (one rouble credit ticket 
equalled 3.5 roubles of assignatsiy). This led to a 3.5-fold price drop and a number of economic 
difficulties.  
After the Russian-Turkish War of 1877-1878 the credit rouble depreciated again. Amid a 
favourable trading environment and after lengthy preparations, particularly by finance ministers 
Bunge and Vyshnegradsky, Sergey Vitte stabilised the rouble on the basis of the gold rouble in 
1897 (gold had been selected after long deliberation). The gold rouble was ideal money and was 
not minted  (Ilin, 2006, p. 196). Minted money included the  imperial (15 roubles) and the 
poluimperial (7.5 roubles), and subsequently a five rouble gold coin; demand for these coins was 
low and distribution was limited.  
The gold rouble became a unit of account according to the 1899 Monyetniy Ustav Act, 
while private transactions statutorily employed silver coinage (1 rouble, 50 kopecks and 25 
kopecks) for settlements of up to 25 gold roubles and copper coinage for settlements of up to three 
gold roubles’ worth. Issues of credit roubles were limited by the requirement for no less than a 50 
% gold cover on sums of up to 600 million roubles, and for complete cover for  higher sums
15.  
                                                                 
14 Between 1698 and 1711 the monetary income from these measures reached 29.3 % of the money supply.  
15No new medium of exchange appeared under Vitte; what did change was the monetary unit, with the value of the 
paper rouble being set at two thirds of that of the new gold rouble. Such devaluation is effected by changing the 
value of the unit of account, this being better “for it does not impact the prices of goods but merely makes the 
metal m onetary unit equal to the market value of paper money in which prices are expressed.” ( Tugan-
Baranovsky, 1909, p. 412).   8 
There is considerable evidence that gold coinage was not met enthusiastically by the public; 
people were either uninterested or found such coinage unsuited to their needs. A number of 
economists feel that the Vitte reform was forced and wrong-headed, the Russian populace having 
no need for such coinage (the needs of foreign capital were a different matter, it preferring stable 
money). Economists aware of the contemporary Russian realities felt that the forced introduction of 
the gold rouble led to losses for the state and contradicted the habits of a public used to paper 
money. According to Pr Nikolsky : 
 
We Russians, who deal daily with paper money, can testify that the thought processes 
ascribed to us by the aforementioned economists do not cross our minds. While purchasing the 
greatest variety of objects with paper money day in and day out, we never see in our mind’s eye the 
value of whatever amount of coin (cited by Demostenov, 1937, p. 126). 
 
If we recall that the Asian monetary tradition involved paper money from ancient times 
(China is a notable instance
16), we can conclude that Type 1 monetary systems were characteristic 
of Asian monetary institutions. The unwilling and reluctant adaptation of the Russian public and 
merchant classes to the Western European monetary tradition (Type 2) bears witness to this. 
In conclusion, the table below illustrates the results of the Russian historian Klyuchevsky’s 
studies, who in 1882 attempted to trace the purchasing power of the rouble from the 15




Table 1:  
Depreciation of the Russian rouble   
 
Years   Rouble values expressed in 1882 
roubles (1882 price basis = 1) 
1500  Over 100 
1501-1550  63 to 73 
1551-1600  60 to 74 
1601-1612  12 
1613-1636  14 
1651-1700  17 
1701-1715  9 
1730-1740  10 
1741-1750  9 
1882  1 
 




  Now let us regard the various functional divisions proposed by Fantacci. Since everything is 
made more comprehensible by comparison, I shall enumerate others who have also stressed the 
duality of money.  
What comes to mind is the proximity of the typology of monetary economy expressed by 
Walter Eucken in  Die Grundlagen der Nationalökonomie. Employing a methodology which 
                                                                 
16 Eagleton and Williams (2007).   9 
combines elements of the historical school and a deductive approach, Eucken formulates two types 
or “pure forms” of monetary economy: 
 
Many national economists say that money is a means of exchange and a measure of value. 
This  definition  cannot  take  us  too  far ...  History shows that in different cultures and over many 
centuries, the division between these two functions was customary, that their division and merger 
were balanced historically, or even t hat division predominated  [...]. Two pure basic forms of the 
monetary economy must be distinguished. In the first basic form money is also used as an accounting 
unit, while in the second basic form money and accounting units are two distinct concepts ... The 
economic process develops in entirely different ways as regards planning and the actual progress of 
events within each of the two basic forms ... (Eucken, 2001 [1969], pp. 203-205) 
 
Eucken considered that an  independent monetary theory must be constructed for each 
pure form of monetary economy. Using his abstraction approach and observing the wealth structure 
of different economic entities, Eucken formulated three types of “pure monetary systems” which 
relate solely to means of exchange (termed “money”). The German economist defined three pure 
monetary systems depending on how money appeared and disappeared, viz. where commodities 
became money; where money arose through expenditure of labour; and finally, where money arose 
through credit. The task of monetary theory was formulated anew as the need to show: 
 
 ... what influence the presence and utilisation of individual monetary systems exerts on the 
economic process of an exchange economy and how the difference between the two basic forms of 
monetary economy affects the economic process ... how money governs the economic process within 
an exchange economy. This is the task of monetary theory ... (Eucken, 2001 [1969], pp. 219-220)
17.  
 
  The main difference in approach between Fantacci and Eucken is that while the former links 
money  above all to its measuring function, the latter sees it essentially as a means of exchange. 
Focusing on the differences, while Fantacci sets the means of measurement as logically and 
historically preceding the means of exchange, the ordoliberals (here we can also mention Wilhelm 
Röpke and Constantino Bresciani-Turroni), Austrian monetary theorists (Carl Menger, Ludwig von 
Mises,  Murray  Rothbard,  Friedrich  von  Hayek,  contemporary  Austrians  like  Hans-Hermann 
Hoppe, as well as Joseph Salerno and Pascal Salin), do the opposite. They see the means of 
exchange function leading both logically and historically to money also becoming a means of 
measurement (the means of exchange is the basic and sole function of money). For his part, and 
following the logic of assigning priority to the means of measurement, Fantacci rebuffs the function 
of storing value and repaying debt. T he means of exchange function prevails among  the 
ordoliberals, thus “genetically”  establishing  the store of value function as basic along with  the 
purchasing power (indeed, exactly how long a time must elapse before one can state that a means 
of exchange has turned into a store of value?).  
Dwelling  briefly  on the Austrian School
18, for which money is foremost a means of 
exchange and of transferring value through time and space, ever since Carl Menger’s renowned 
article of 1892 the origin  of money  has been regarded by adherents of that school as a self-
generating, endogenous market institution which was monopolised and became public significantly 
                                                                 
17 Eucken claims that it was precisely the division that allowed European trade to flourish in the late Middle Ages.  
18 Ellis (1934) has done a review of the German-speaking school of monetary theory. He is also one of the leading 
specialists on currency control and clearing where the means of measurement become the leading function and 
are separated from the means of exchange function.   10 
later
19. By monopolising money supply - intentionally or not - the state unbalanced the amount of 
money needed by the economy, causing deformations in relative prices and calculating chaos. This 
chaos obscures all reference needed for business decisions. The sole institutional  solution is to 
privatise the money supply and leave it to market forces. This would introduce self-regulatory 
mechanisms such as adverse clearing among issuing banks, restoring money supply to its necessary 
level
20. Most Austrian adherents are uninterested in the unit of account (it is not a function of 
money), while they generally agree on the public and inclusive character of the unit of account. 
Some of them see merit in arriving at a single means of measurement, due to its external effects and 
to its similarities with language as a mean of communication. Few propound competition between 
units of account, one such being Hayek’s 1977-1978 model.  
The Austrians regard the very merger of the unit of account and mean of exchange functions 
which is basic to Type 2 critically. Why? I shall put forward my explanation. Once production of 
the merged means of measurement and means of exchange (money) becomes a state monopoly, 
money  (its quantity and movements)  influences the unit of account  destroying  essential 
communicative channels. 
The Austrians insist on a means of measurement which is stable over extended periods, or 
else - if it is mutable - on change being symmetrical for all economic agents, impacting price levels 
while retaining the structure of  micro-prices. Thus, changes in price levels are removed from 
changes in relative prices and do not bring major changes in income distribution. While Type 1 
features an additional rate of exchange, an additional price (that of buying into means of measure), 
Type 2 lacks this rate or price. Type 2 has no ideal money, it having been merged materially with 
the means of exchange, and thus quantitative and qualitative m anipulations of the latter create 
insecurity from the standpoint of the state. In Type 2, the state does not change prices (exchange 
rate of the medium of exchange expressed in ideal money) but rather manipulates the medium of 
exchange by changing its supply or amending the metal content of coinage. The dominant monetary 
theory in Type 2 is the quantitative theory, according to which prices depend on the supply of 
money (whether coinage or bills) and the state is tasked with controlling this supply either 
discretionally o r following set rules. In Type 1 , rate changes between measure and mean of 
exchange did not entail changes in the value of the unit of measure which affected relative prices
21.  
Within the Austrian  school  there are diverse theoretical models and specific monetary 
reform proposals which rest precisely on the difference between measure and means of exchange. 
Some free money models tackle the subject of dividing its reckoning and exchange functions, with 
certain theoreticians considering this as  possible and desirable ( Yeager, 2001) while others 
consider it impossible and illogical (White, 1984) and prefer to stop privatisation of the means of 
exchange.  
Among the diversity of institutional configurations, Hayek’s proposal stands out (Hayek, 
1985).  He  suggests  competition between means of exchange which may be convertible into 
commodity baskets. Hayek proposes competition between units of account and selection between 
monetary measures as well. Here, the state is even deprived of the ability to define the means of 
reckoning, an ability assumed by a number of adherents of competing money such as Black, Fama, 
Yeager. Competition would extend to price levels and become total. Hayek thought that after a 
                                                                 
19 Eucken distinguishes two types of origins: global, of the monetary economy (depending on whether unit of 
account and means of exchange are merged or not) and specific, of the monetary system itself, or of the medium 
of exchange (Menger’s article relates only to this one).  
20 Selgin and White (1994).  
21 This is closer to Friedman’s helicopter according to which all economic subjects suddenly receive more money.   11 
certain period of competition between standards, exchange rates between “the best” of them would 
very likely  be fixed, facilitating measuring.  The idea of commodity b asket cover was not  a 
contribution made by Hayek. First, covering means of exchange with goods was considered as a 
natural (‘genetically determined’) way of overcoming fluctuations in the value of money. Second, a 
number of economists have criticised the practice of tying money down to a single commodity. We 
have known a number of proposals for cover by more than one commodity
22, such as: bimetal 
mixed coin  composed of gold and silver (Walras, Edgeworth, Marshall); gold and silver 
combinations which fluctuate according to trading (Newcomb); a tabular standard for indexing 
prices to set tables (Jevons); dollar stabilisation through a mean weighted index of basic commodity 





Let us now direct our attention to those authors whose research supports Fantacci’s views.  
As mentioned, Luca Fantacci is critical of the merger between measure and means of 
exchange (Type 2) for reasons other than those cited by the Austrian School. He considers that in 
losing the exchange rate (the price of real money expressed in ideal money), the state has deprived 
itself of an important discretionary tool; from a purely historical point of view, tariff changes and the 
use of token coinage have offered opportunities of  solving a number of purely internal problems, 
such as deficits of small change. Deriving his arguments from Type 2, Fantacci rejects the store of 
value function, seeing spending and uninterrupted circulation as the purposes of the means of 
exchange. All monetary hoarding is harmful since retaining money is harmful and unsustainable for 
the economy. It is not by chance that Fantacci shares Keynes’ views
24. Though  the Austrians 
consider interest as the price of savings rather than of money, they do not deny the preservation and 
transmission of value as a basic function of money (they see it as stemming from its means of 
exchange). 
A number of social scholars have shown the leading role of the measure function of money 
in different ways, all in the spirit of Fantacci. Foremost among them are François Simiand, Marc 
Bloch, Georg Simmel, Léon Walras, Ernest Solvay, Georg Knapp, and today’s French economists 
Michel Aglietta, André Orléan, Jerome Blanc, et al.
25 They feel that reckoning preceded exchange; 
the latter is characteristic only of economic exchange, while the former is a fundamental artefact of 
social exchange. Units of measure have inclusive origins, drawing legitimacy from the diverse forms 
of sovereignty developed by society. The sacral origin in question has been stressed by many 
anthropologists as reported by Marcel Mauss, with the French subsequently developing an entire 
branch of monetary theory which regards money as having arisen from the exchange of gifts (many 
papers have been published in the MAUSS
26 journal).  
                                                                 
22 Fisher (1920), Laughlin (1931) and Friedman (1951). 
23 See Rist’s critique of Ricardo and the quantitative theorists who failed to mention the convertibility principle 
(Rist, 1938).  
24 Fantacci cites Keynes when he says that genuine monetary history began with Solon’s 6
th century BC reforms, 
which amended the ratio between means of reckoning and of exchange, showing that monetary institutions are 
linked to sovereignty and politics. In his “Theory of Money” Keynes has expressed the dual character of the 
monetary system, differentiating between ‘money of account’ and ‘money’ and unambiguously stressing the 
latter’s leading role. 
25 Zelizer (1994). 
26 MAUSS (Mouvement anti-utilitariste dans les sciences sociales). See also the collection of papers by Aglietta, 
and Orléan (éd.) (1999), Cartellier, J. (1996), Orléan (1991, 1992). Lakomski-Laguerre (2002) presents Schumpeter’s 
monetary theory.   12 
In this sense, the latest book by Aglietta and Orléan (2002) offers a new reply to the 
question as to the nature of money, discovering its roots in overcoming innate human violence (as in 
earlier publications, they actively  employ René Girard’s theory of mimetic violence
27). Such 
fundamental detail is beside the point here; what matters is that the two authors place the 
measurement function centre stage, seeing it not only as basic, but also as offering the possibility of 
altering the logic of basic economic causality. Thus, the sequence is not “value ? price ? money”, 
but rather “money ? price ? value” (the authors criticise Marx’s Capital from what they claim to 
be a truly  Marxian position). Money is the fundamental condition for the genesis of utility or of 
value. The French authors see the emergence of measures as extra-economic. As regards exchange 
(considered as secondary), it emerged spontaneously and haphazardly (here, the authors’ views 
have shifted notably over the past two decades to the typically Austrian model of spontaneously 
emergent means of exchange of which they had been trenchantly critical in the past
28). The holistic 
and abstract nature of measures renews the theoretical grounds on which the authors plead for 
active state management of monetary processes. Aglietta and Orléan analyse monetary practice 
historically (in antiquity, Middle Ages and modernity), tracing the “trajectories of money” to show 
the historical significance of reckoning, as well as the dichotomy between ideal and real money. 
Jerome Blanc’s studies, devoted to parallel currencies and money substitutes, are in the same spirit. 
He, too, names the  fonction de compte (accounting function) as “the genuinely fundamental 
monetary f unction” (Blanc, 2000, p. 25). Blanc considers - as does Fantacci  - that exchange 
(modes de  paiement) plays a subject role, while storing value ( réserve de valeur) is not 
specifically a monetary function. Blanc regards money as a system which diffuses and transfers its 
generic functions to diverse monetary instruments
29.   
Similarly, the works of Randall Wray and Stephanie Bell follow the Chartalist monetary 
theory and more generally the spirit of the post-Keynesian endogeneous monetary model
30. Wray 
(1998, 2000, 2004a, 2004b) shows the emergence of money from the power of the state and from 
its fiscal function (especially taxation). Here, money and its function of measurement are a logical 
sequence of the dinamics of debt and credit in society. Bell (2001) identifies the credit and 
accounting character of money, as well as the hierarchy of the different monetary forms
31. Ingram 
(1996, 2004), proposes a theory of money as a social relation, where he similarly links the origin of 
money to the public sector. He also outlines his interpretation of the evolution of money, backed up 
by numerous historical examples (this is possibly the closest to Fantacci’s dual model). 
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27 Aglietta and Orléan (1984). 
28 La violence de la monnaie. Nowadays the two writers speak about mimetic monetary competition: something 
not entirely different from competition between monetary issuers.  
29 See the Russian economist Genkin (2002). On the history of small money I shall mention Velde (1998). 
30See Goodhart (1998, 2000). In Wray (ed.), 2004, the pioneering monetary ideas of Innes are presented. Innes is 
not a unique case of neglect of the monetary economist; the case of Alexander Del Mar is even more eloquent. 
His theory of money (practically the same as Innes’s) and his unsurpassed historical research on monetary 
systems (Del Mar, 1906, 1896) are rarely explored.  
31 Economic sociologists have reached consensus regarding the fiscal origin of money (Weber, Sombart, Polaniy, 
Schumpeter, Ellias, Kula etc.). The Polish economist Witold Kula looked at the links between money and taxes 
during different phases of feudal and capitalist economy (Kula, 1970, 1962). Recently the “fiscal theory of price 
level” has become popular (the price level becomes solely a function of the taxes, after money has eliminated from 
the price level equation). This theory, inspired by the writings of Wicksel, gives a leading role to the means of 
measurement in opposition to the “search models”, which are a continuation of Menger’s views of the origin of 
money as a means of exchange.    13 
   
  In his book, Fantacci presents a picture of money’s institutional character through the prism 
of what is mostly a historical study. Meanwhile, though recent years have witnessed a rapid 
advance of institutional economics (Hodgson, 2001, 2006), attempts to integrate knowledge thus 
accumulated are generally absent in Fantacci’s work. Without blaming him (his objectives were 
different), I conjecture how this gap may be filled. The approach  presented below  offers the 
possibility of interpreting the evolution of monetary institutions in the light of the division between 
unit of account and medium of exchange (the transition from Type 1 to Type 2) and also a solution 
to Cippola’s observation on why there should be a global trend to monetary depreciation.  
  Two basic postulates may be stated without going into methodological details. First, that the 
rules for measuring and comparing value I1 and for exchange I2 should be regarded as entirely 
independent institutions as regards historical genesis and development logic
32. The former is intrinsic 
to social exchange, having emerged at the genesis of humanity; the latter appeared at a later stage 
and is essentially typical of economic exchange. Second, that money ought to be interpreted as an 
institutional composite: a complex network of institutions which develop not only as a result of the 
interplay between the two rules mentioned above, but are also subject to the influence of other 
basic institutions such as religion and state, to name but two. The monetary composite does not 
exist in a vacuum, being integrated in the overall institutional dynamics.  
The institutions of reckoning I1 and exchange I2 may be complementary or exclusive, with 
the criterion being whether one boosts or cuts the effectiveness of the other
33. Institutional 
effectiveness relates to the ability to improve coordination and cooperation between agents and to 
render the distribution of incomes more acceptable. Effectiveness may also relate to the abilities of 
an institution to allow increasing complexity in agent behaviour and the appearance of new 
practices, to be open to new developments. Agent micro behaviour and demand for services linked 
with reckoning and exchange must be the basic criteria for judging the new rules.  
There is a certain hierarchical relationship between the two institutions: the higher-placed 
rule would govern (be ‘the rule of rules’) and the lower-placed one would  rarely  change. 
Sociologically, the institutions of reckoning and exchange and their hierarchical relationship (within 
the monetary composite) reflect the efforts of diverse groups and individuals and the interplay of 
their economic, political and spiritual interests. These groups use other institutions (mostly the state 
and ideology, and prior to that religious ones) as levers to influence the institutional architecture of 
I1 and I2. This results in the different configurations illustrated by Fantacci, Type 1 or Type 2 
monetary systems.  
  From this point, I assume the following logic: starting from the status of language as the 
fundamental constituent institution which permits the existence of other institutions and which is the 
basic “medium of representation” (Searle, 2005)
34, we note that the I 1 rule of  reckoning is 
genetically closer to language (it is a bridge linking language with economic exchange)
35. As with 
language, means of measuring value are ideal in themselves; their origin is not economic, but before 
all else social. This type of rule allows the development of abstract and rational thought, and 
                                                                 
32 Searle (2005), Hodgson (2006). 
33 Masahiko Aoki and Bruno Amable developed the idea of institutional complementarity. 
34 According to Searle (2005, p. 12): “... you may have language without money, property, state, or family, yet you 
cannot have money, property, state, or family without language.” Without being a monetary economist, he notes: 
“You can usually imagine a society that has money without having any currency at all” (p. 16).  
35  Early  units  of  account were directly  interchangeable  with  units of weight (ex. the pound), while so-called 
measurement scales existed yet earlier as discussed in detail in Burns (1927). On money as language, symbol and 
sign, see Foucault’s Les mots et les choses.   14 
subsequently monetary reckoning and accounting, in turn lending great impetus to trading. I1 is 
every bit as intractable to change as are measuring institutions similar to it (think of the failure of 
introducing the decimal unit of time in revolutionary France in 1792 or of the six-day week in the 
1930s’ Soviet Union). 
The other institution  I2 is first and foremost linked with the emergence of markets and 
economies in  human development. While the former institution sought uniformity (a shared 
measurement unit), this institution seeks diversity (a diversity of means of exchange). Within this 
institution we may discern two sub-rules or lower-order institutions, I21 and I22. They coordinate 
respectively the behaviour of economic exchange within a state and between states, in other words 
they are internal and external
36. Though I2 treats real rather than notional processes, following the 
logic of language internal money is closer to it than external money (proof of this is the presence of 
base paper bills in internal turnover and of noble metal coinage externally). In other words, the 
inclusiveness or totality of the rules under examination declines the farther away we move from 
language:  22 21 1 I I I ﬁ ﬁ  
Continuing, we note that the rules of exchange as manifest in the means of exchange (coin 
or bill) are private by origin, there being no nexus with the state or the sovereign. This is historically 
documented, for i nstance in Burns (1927). The more a community grows (from city to state to 
empire), the stronger the functions of the I2 means of exchange become at the expense of the I1 
measure of exchange. 
In time, within the priorities of the state the profit motif begins to dominate over those of 
effective money circulation (again Burns, 1927). The state gradually turns into an instrument for the 
domination of certain groups and monopolises the rules of internal exchange or I21. Changing 
internal money into token coinage gives the state the opportunity to boost its income and to 
broaden its redistributional abilities. The transition from a dual money system to a syncretic one may 
also be interpreted using the proposed logic. The interests of the state (or rather of its governing 
group) are in favour of merging the means of reckoning and of exchange with a view to boosting its 
capacity for discretionary redistribution. The state gains a direct, yet relatively unnoticeable, ability 
to influence relative prices and income differentials between groups and individuals by controlling 
the supply of means of exchange and their movements. In other words, manipulating the rules of 
exchange results in manipulation of that part of the monetary compound which is closest to 
language. This destroys information, harms the entire system of planning and decision making, 
increases uncertainty, and destroys incentives, inter alia. It now reverses priorities and changes the 
hierarchical relationship between the two institutions:  I21 assumes primacy and determines I1 
structurally.  
We have seen how hierarchy within the monetary institution changes under the influence of 
external non-monetary institutions (the state) and how the monetary compound is removed from the 
primordial significance of language. In this sense, within the Type 2 model the two institutions are at 
odds with each other, or rather I21 is at odds with I1. From this situation stem not only logical 
proposals for decompounding this “ institutional mutant” by privatising the means of exchange 
I21, but also the pinning of hopes on the ability of new decentralised information technology to tear 
apart (even to remove) the means of exchange from the unit of account (through online barter), and 
to resolve “exact change” issues. 
As regards the dilemma of what the word “money” has meant through the ages, Searle’s 
definition of what an institution is would be suitable: it is the “assignment of status function, X counts 
as Y, or, more typically, X counts as Y in context C” (Searle, 2005). In the case of money, means 
                                                                 
36 See the empirical analysis by Pryor (1977).   15 
of reckoning have the status of money in Type 1, while means of exchange have the same status in 
Type 2
37.  
If we now return to the Cippola “law”, we see that a possible solution is precisely the 
existence and expansion of the state: manipulating the monetary compound in its favour (most of all 
by passing from Type 1 to Type 2) devalues the medium of exchange in the long run. Thus, we are 
witnesses to what is mostly a social dynamics in which a basic institution (the state), being an arena 
of conflict between different groups, changes the basic structure of the monetary institution in its 
favour. Indeed, though he focuses only on the mediaeval period, Cippola himself lists this as one of 





Yet, can we judge history and accuse it for the choice of one model of monetary evolution 
rather than another? Can we divine what may have happened had a different institutional path been 
chosen?  
I can only state that what we may regret is the simplification of monetary rules, or as Hayek 
put it, the non-use of “broadly defined rules.” He showed that the state limited experiments with 
money from the very outset. This turned money into a “deformed offspring which has suffered in 
having to traverse too-limiting channels and whose potential has thus been stunted” (Hayek, 1985, 
pp. 323-335).  This lack of experiment and innovation is the basic reason which limits our 
theoretical speculation as to possible trajectories of monetary regimes. 
If we strive to improve the effectiveness of monetary institutions in a future doubtless full of 
deep change, our sole guide to correct decisions would be a striving to understand the various 
motives of agent micro-behavior, be it in value reckoning or in exchange practice. This means not 
only the mechanical measuring of perceived links, but also attempting to understand the interests, 
reactions and strategies of these agents within a broad social context which includes not only the 
economy but also the political sphere, the emergence of ideas and behavior models. The words of 
the great Italian historian, Carlo Cipolla, sound like a warning to any scholar who is thinking of 
investigating the history of money: “It will be a big mistake to look at the history of money simply 
according to its technical elements – it reflects political as well as economic history too”, Cipolla, 
1975, p. 102). 
Fantacci has followed this advice  engendering discussion on basic issues of monetary 
theory. Further research will have to look into the mechanisms of interplay between the processes 







                                                                 
37 In Type 1 era the names of means of exchange derived from those of units of account. Aristotle called money 
nomtsma (“institution”), while means of exchange were named after popular commodities such as animals or 
leather. Hesitation as to what constitutes money is evident as early as Aristotle. In Nichomachean Ethics  he 
links money with measurement and ideal money, while linking it with means of exchange and thus real money in 
Politics.    16 
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